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ABSTRACT  
The goal of this paper is to evaluate whether the incentives incorporated in toll highway 
concession contracts in order to encourage private operators to adopt measures to reduce 
accidents are actually effective at improving safety. To this end, we implemented negative 
binomial regression models using information about highway characteristics and accident data 
from toll highway concessions in Spain from 2007 to 2009. Our results show that even though 
road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not managed by the contractor, such as the 
annual average daily traffic (AADT), the percentage of heavy vehicles on the highway, number 
of lanes, number of intersections and average speed; the implementation of these incentives has 
a positive influence on the reduction of accidents and injuries. Consequently, this measure 
seems to be an effective way of improving safety performance in road networks.  
Keywords: Interurban toll highway; concession contract, performance-based indicators, 
incentives; road safety incentives; road accident; negative binomial regression.  
 
Highlights:  
 
> Safety based incentives are becoming popular to reward or penalize highway private operators 
in toll concession contracts. > Most concession contracts link these incentives (bonuses and 
penalties) to indicators based on accident, injury and fatality rates. > This paper finds that safety 
incentives have a statistically significant influence on road safety. > Ceteris paribus, there are 
more accidents and injuries on highway segments without incentives than on highway segments 
with incentives. 
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1. Introduction  
In the past few decades road management approaches have substantially evolved all over the 
world. Traditionally, construction, maintenance and operation of road networks used to be 
handled by in-house personnel employed by government-owned road agencies. However, in 
recent years many road authorities have tended to implement models aimed at contracting out 
the management of the whole, or part, of the road life-cycle activities with private companies. 
The aim of contracting-out is to take advantage of the greater efficiency that is expected to be 
provided by the private sector in delivering public services.  
 
One of the most popular ways of contracting-out road management is through toll concession 
contracts. This type of contract consists of transferring the management of the life-cycle 
activities of a certain road stretch to a private consortium that will be entrusted with the design, 
construction, financing, management and operation for a fixed or variable period of time that is 
contractually agreed in advance. The private concessionaire will obtain the revenues to finance 
road management expenses mostly from tolls charged to road users. Toll prices and the way to 
update them over time are usually set in the concession contracts.  
 
Other kinds of sophisticated contracts have also been proposed during this time, such as Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs), including the Design Build Operate Finance (DBFO) model 
implemented in the United Kingdom, have been developed to contract-out road management 
activities. One of the principles of PPP contracts was to pay the contractor according to the 
service provided. To that end, a set of performance-based indicators were defined in these 
contracts in such a way that a better fulfilment of these indicators would entitle the contractor to 
receive a higher payment. These performance-based indicators intend to reflect the quality of 
service to the user by measuring lane availability, state of the pavement and signalling, road 
safety, etc.  
 
These indicators incorporated in PPP contracts have also been introduced in some toll highway 
concession contracts through economic incentives associated with the fulfilment of 
performance-based indicators to encourage contractors to reach the highest level of service. The 
term incentive refers to any kind of economic profit with which the concessionaire will be 
rewarded according to the contract if its performance is good enough. The main reason behind 
introducing incentives in toll concession contracts is to encourage the contractors to provide a 
better service by aligning the social and the private benefits in order to produce a more efficient 
outcome to society.  
 
Incentives related to performance-based indicators in PPPs are defined in such a way that if the 
contractor performs below a certain quality threshold, the contractor will be penalized while if 
the contractor does it above a certain quality threshold, it will be rewarded (Rangel, 2011; 
Vassallo, 2007). Some of the most common performance-based indicators introduced in toll 
highway concession have to do with congestion, road accidents, pavement surface conditions, 
impact on the environment, and availability. Toll concession contracts usually specify the 
rewards and penalizations clearly in their terms. 
 
In this paper, we will focus on the economic incentives in toll highway concessions linked to 
explicit road safety indicators. In Spain, some concessionaires are entitled to extend their 
concession terms if their accident levels are further below the average of highways with similar 
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characteristics in terms of alignment, AADT, etc.  
Spain turns out to be a good example for this research because the country has extensive 
experience in managing and financing highways through PPPs. Most of the PPPs have been put 
into effect through concession contracts that have a long tradition in Spanish administrative law. 
The first highway concessions in Spain were awarded in 1967 (Izquierdo and Vassallo, 2004). 
From the beginning, highway concessions in Spain were granted to private consortia through 
competitive bids. Most of the highway concessions awarded in Spain have been toll highways.  
 
The aim of this research is to analyze whether the economic incentives to improve road safety in 
toll concession contracts implemented in Spain are effective at improving road safety. To this 
end, we used an econometric model based on negative binomial regressions to analyze the effect 
of safety incentives on accidents in toll highways. The results indicate that for some of the 
models tested ceteris paribus there is a statistically significant difference in the number of 
accidents and injuries on road segments without incentives when compared with other segments 
with incentives.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we describe the practical experience in the 
introduction of safety-based incentives in road management contracts in different countries and 
particularly in toll highway concessions in Spain. In section 3 we provide the literature review 
of models explaining the variables influencing road safety ratios. In section 4 we explain the 
variables and the data sources employed for the empirical analysis. In section 5 we develop the 
methodology and explain the results. In the sixth and last section, we discuss the results and 
highlight the main conclusions.  
 
2. Safety-based incentives in road management contracts  
2.1 Cross-country experience  
Europe is the world’s region with the longest tradition of incorporating economic incentives 
linked to safety-based indicators in road management contracts such as PPPs or toll 
concessions. This happened for instance in Spain, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Portugal and the 
United Kingdom. Italy introduced price-caps tied to road safety indicators in such a way that the 
concessionaire is allowed to set higher tolls if safety ratios are better (Vassallo et al., 2009).  
 
Safety-based incentives are characterized by three attributes: first, the indicator used to measure 
safety performance; second, the thresholds above or below which bonuses and penalties are 
implemented; and third, the way economic incentives are put into effect.  
 
Safety indicators play a key role in providing information on performance. They are often used 
to define safety priorities or reach action plans based on benchmarking. The design of the road 
safety indicators is quite heterogeneous. There are differences both in the variable adopted to 
measure the outcome and in the final formula employed. Most of the contracts include number 
of injuries, number of fatalities or a combination of number of light accidents, serious accidents 
and fatal accidents to build the indicator (Rangel, 2011).  
 
It is a generalized practice to include exposure to risk expressed by traffic (risk expressed by 
traffic on the road). In fact, only the first British shadow toll road contracts did not introduce 
traffic, at the time they used absolute number of personal injury accidents as indicator. The rest 
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of the contracts with safety incentives took into account this factor in some way. Very often, the 
initial accident data is divided by the annual traffic—usually measured in terms of millions or 
billions of vehicles-kilometres. E18 road (Muurla–Lohja) in Finland, the M6 road in Hungary, 
several toll highways in Portugal (the IP-4, for instance) and the latest roads awarded in Spain 
use this methodology. The advantage of introducing the exposure to the risk (traffic) explicitly 
is that distortions in road safety results are reduced. However, the number of accidents, injuries 
and fatalities do not necessarily increase linearly with traffic flow, drivers may be more careful 
in denser traffic. Although the number of vehicles at risk is proportional to traffic flow, the 
number of accidents, injuries and fatalities should not necessarily be proportional to the traffic 
volume (Aljanahi et al, 1999). 
 
Regarding the threshold above or below which incentives are to be applied, many contracts 
include a process for comparing highways with similar characteristics in terms of traffic, 
number of carriageways, etc. With this approach it is possible to control the global evolution of 
casualties by many factors, most of them not managed by the road operator. Some road 
contracts where thresholds are set in this way are the E-18 road (Grimstad – Kristiansand) in 
Norway, and some roads awarded in the United Kingdom (for example, A1 & M25).  
 
Regarding the way of rewarding the contractor, we have identified two major ways of doing it: 
extending the term of the contract, as it is usually done in toll highway concession contracts in 
Spain; or modifying the corresponding toll or fee.  
 
2.2. Toll highway concessions in Spain  
Historically Spain experienced several shifts in the way different governments understood road 
management and financing. As a consequence of that, we now find different types of roads and 
highways according to the way they are managed and operated. The trunk network is mostly 
managed in two different ways: free highways, which are built, managed and operated by the 
central and regional governments (11,000 km); and toll highways (3,016 km), which are 
managed by private companies through concession contracts (Ministerio de Fomento de España, 
2009a). In the last few years some governments in Spain, particularly regional governments, 
have started to develop PPP contracts based on shadow-toll (Vassallo and Pérez de Villar, 2010; 
Rangel, 2011) and availability payment approaches (Harding et al., 2010). However, these 
highways—some of them not yet operational—still represent a small percentage of the trunk 
network. 
 
Spain has extensive experience in managing and financing highways through concession 
contracts that have a long tradition in Spanish administrative law. From the beginning, highway 
concessions in Spain were competitively awarded to private consortia through competitive bids. 
This is substantially different from the situation in other European countries such as France and 
Italy, who directly entrusted toll highways to public-private companies which were mostly 
controlled by the government. The Spanish approach has been successful because of two 
reasons. First, the strong competition between bidders ensures important efficiency gains. And 
second, the simplicity of the tender enabled the government to have the toll highway available 
for the users in a short time (Vassallo and Izquierdo, 2010).  
 
In this paper we will focus our analysis only on toll highway concession for several reasons. 
First, they have similar management approaches. Second, road alignments and maintenance 
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requirements are fairly similar across toll highway concessions. Third, previous research 
(Rangel, et al. 2012) has already focused on evaluating the influence of road management (toll 
vs. free highways) on different safety ratios in Spain. And fourth, in this paper we want to focus 
on the effect of incentives, which at the time of writing were only implemented in some toll 
highway concessions.  
Toll concession contracts awarded from 2002 onwards were characterized by introducing 
incentives linked to the management and maintenance of highways. The contractor must meet 
certain performance indicators such as state of the pavement (roughness and skid resistance), 
congestion (average travel time), road accidents, queuing in toll plazas, quality perception of 
users measured through annual surveys conducted by the road authority and vehicle breakdown 
(services, availability and response time).  
 
For safety performance, the indicators used were the Risk Index (RI), and the Mortality Index 
(MI). The thresholds and incentives defined in the contracts work in the following way:  
 
 The concessionaire will be entitled to one additional year of the concession contract if, 
at least, 90% of time during the 35 years of the concession, both RI and MI remain 
between 90% and 75% of the annual average value of those toll highway concessions 
with similar Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) (+/- 5,000 vehicles/day). 
 
 The concessionaire will be entitled to two additional years of the concession contract if, 
at least, 90% of time during the 35 years of the concession, both RI and MI remain 
below 75% of the annual average value of those toll highways with similar Annual 
Average Daily Traffic (AADT) (+/- 5,000 vehicles/day). 
 
The incentive is expected to materialize in additional profits for the concessionaire since two 
additional years would entail additional revenue much higher than the additional maintenance 
expenditure. The bonus, however, is not as big as it appears to be at first sight because, if the 
bonus was going to be given it would take place at the end of the concession period. In order to 
rightly quantify for the extra-profit produced by this incentive, we have to calculate its present 
value by discounting the net revenues of the additional years at the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC), which for concessions in Spain is around 7.5%. The calculation, which would 
vary depending on the traffic levels at the end of the concession period, shows that the incentive 
would be able to increase the present value of the cash-flow no longer than 2% compared to the 
scenario where the bonus was not ultimately obtained. This implies that the incentive is not 
expected to have a great influence on the final value of the concession.  
 
Other European countries that have been introducing safety-based indicators in road 
management contracts implemented much higher incentives. Vassallo et al. (2009) found that in 
some management contracts such as the E18 Muurla-Lohja in Finland, incentives were ten 
times higher than they are in toll highway concessions in Spain.  
 
3. Models to evaluate the influence of certain variables on road safety: a literature review 
In this section we conduct a literature review to know the effect of certain variables that 
influence road safety. In addition, we show the latest trends in road safety modelling.  
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Although the ordinary least square regression model (OLS) is applied in the road safety 
literature (Hakim et al., 1991; Zlatopher, 1988), some other authors have questioned its 
suitability (Jovanis and Chang, 1986; Miaou et al., 1992; Miaou and Lum, 1993). This method 
assumes that the dependent variable is continuous and normally distributed with a constant 
variance. This technique lacks the distributional property necessary to describe adequately 
random, discrete and non-negative events such as traffic accidents. Consequently the statistic 
results derived from these OLS models are questionable. One concern in using multiple linear 
regressions is that the number of traffic accidents may not have a normal distribution but instead 
follow a Poisson distribution.  
 
The relationships using the Poisson distribution have been developed by means of the technique 
of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs). The Poisson distribution represents a significant 
advance to describe traffic accident data. However, one of the stated limitations of the Poisson 
regression model is that it presupposes that the variance of the accident frequency is equal to its 
mean when in practice the variance of the traffic accident data tends to be larger than the mean. 
This extra variation is known as overdispersion and, if it is present, the estimated coefficients 
may be biased and inefficient. Overdispersion does not affect the values of the model 
parameters, but can affect the Wald statistics or likelihood statistics for testing the hypothesis 
about the parameters. To overcome this problem the more suitable approach is the negative 
binomial (NB) regression model.  
 
Zero Inflated models are also an option when there are excessive zeros in the database. These 
models represent an alternative way to handle data characterized by a significant amount of 
zeros or more zeros than the one would expect in a traditional Poisson or NB (Carson and 
Mannering, 2001; Lee and Mannering, 2002; Qin et al., 2005). However, Lord et al. (2005, 
2007) have questioned the validity of these models in most safety modelling circumstances.  
 
Bayesian models have also been applied in crash analysis (Huang et al., 2008; Haleem et al., 
2010; Haque et al., 2010; Pei et al., 2011). However, some authors seem to suggest that the 
Poisson regression and the NB models possess most of the desirable statistical properties in 
describing vehicle accident events. The Poisson and NB regression models have been widely 
used to analyze count data where the dependent variable is discrete and defined for non-negative 
integers corresponding to the number of events occurring in a given intervals (Miaou and Lum, 
1993; Noland and Oh, 2004; Chang, 2005; Caliendo et al., 2007; Arenas et al., 2009). In light of 
these findings, negative binomial models were applied in this study.  
 
Accident rates and accident frequency are the most common dependent variable used by 
predictive models. The relationship between accident rate or accident frequency and traffic flow 
show a great variation in their results.   
 
Many studies show a statistically significant relationship between accident rate and accident 
frequency with traffic flow. Results show that accident rate decrease with increasing traffic flow 
(Martin, 2002; Hauer and Bamfo, 1997); and accident frequency increases with traffic flow 
(Mohamed et al., 2000; Persaud et al., 2000; Anastasopoulos and Mannering, 2009).  
 
Other studies have been carried out in recent years to establish the relationships between 
accidents and the effect of different vehicle mix (Tay, 2003; Hiselius, 2004; Wong et al., 2007; 
Abdel-Aty and Haleem, 2011, Pei et al., 2011), the frequency of intersections (Ivan and 
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O’Mara, 1997), environmental factors (Chang, 2005; Caliendo et al., 2007; Fridstrøm et al., 
1995; Shankar et al., 1995), geometric infrastructure characteristics (Chang, 2005; Hauer et al., 
2004), number of lanes (Noland and Oh, 2004; Chang, 2005; Milton and Mannering, 1998), and 
speed limits (Fridstrøm et al., 1995; Ossiander and Cummings, 2002; Wong et al., 2005).  
 
The next section describes the data set used for modelling.  
 
4. Data selection and description of the variables adopted  
The models we calibrated in this paper are based on data from 2007, 2008 and 2009. In 2007, 
there were 2,972.4 km of toll highways in Spain, in 2008 there were 2,997.1 km of toll 
highways and in 2009 there were 3,016.3 km of toll highways (Ministerio de Fomento de 
España, 2007a, 2008a, 2009a).  
 
The data used for our empirical model came from two different sources: police-reported 
accident data supplied by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and traffic data supplied by the 
Ministry of Public Works. On the basis of these databases we built up the database for this 
research by combining both accident data and traffic data.  
 
The sample for the models was made up of road segments from the interurban toll highway 
concessions in Spain set up by the road authority, with an average length of road stretch of 9.60 
km. The total number of segments and the length by year are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  
Road segment data.  
 
Year 
Segments 
Length (Km) 
Nº % 
2007 237 34 2,222.62 
2008 206 30 1,959.93 
2009 253 36 2,494.06 
Total 696 100 6,676.61 
 
A total of 696 road segments were extracted out of 836 from the 2007, 2008 and 2009 traffic 
map, after selection criteria based on complete information for traffic flow and infrastructure 
variables. We considered stretches with and without accidents to avoid selection bias. The study 
includes only toll highways. We did not get the whole data from the Spanish toll highway 
network because not all the information that we needed was available. Therefore, the road 
segments in our database may or may not coincide over the years. 
 
In order to design the model, we intended to identify a set of exogenous variables that might 
potentially influence road safety ratios and do not depend on the concessionaire’s ability to 
manage the road through a better design or maintenance. We did not include variables related to 
the road alignment or signalling for two reasons. The first one is that we decided to incorporate 
just those endogenous variables that do not depend on the concessionaire’s ability to manage the 
road. Concessionaires in Spain are free to design the alignment and signaling system as they 
want within a set of minimum standards. They are free for instance to use standards above the 
minimum requirements if they think this will be better for the operation of the road. The second 
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reason is that information about alignment characteristics of the road is not public information 
in Spain. 
 
The exogenous variables that we used for this model are related to traffic flow such as (1) 
Average annual daily traffic (AADT), (2) Percentage of heavy goods vehicles (%HGV) and (3) 
Average speed (SPEED); and certain characteristics of infrastructure such as (4) Length of the 
road stretch (LENGTH), (5) Number of lanes (LANES) and (6) Number of intersections (INT). 
Finally, we selected a dummy variable (7) Incentives (INC), which evaluates whether the 
private contractors have incentives or not to improve safety if the highways are managed by 
them.  
 
Data for AADT, %HGV, SPEED and length of the stretches was available from the Ministry of 
Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento de España, 2007b, 2008b, 2009b). Traffic flow is counted 
as the number of vehicles through a fixed section in both directions. Portable counting 
instrument and permanent inductive loop were used to count the number of vehicles. %HGV 
was calculated from HGV and AADT, and LANES was calculated using the number of lanes 
and the length of each stretch. LANES is the mean weighted by length.  
 
The number of intersections for each stretch (INT) was obtained from the traffic map 
(Ministerio de Fomento de España, 2007b, 2008b, 2009b) by using Geographic Information 
System (GIS), the analyses was performed using ArcGis 10.1 The GIS application was used as a 
tool to integrate the information in two databases. The first database included the alphanumeric 
information about intersections and the second one included geographical information on a 
digital map of toll highways in Spain. Each stretch of the sample was analyzed using the GIS 
application to count the number of intersections. 
 
We analyzed each concession contract in force in 2007, 2008 and 2009 to know which segments 
had road safety incentives (INC). The first Spanish concession contract awarded with 
implementation of road safety incentives was in 2002. We analyzed all of the contracts in place 
from 2002 to 2009. All of the contracts considered in the study have the same kind of incentives 
(enlargement of the contract duration), and they are measured in the same way as explained in 
section 2.2. INC is a dummy variable, which indicates the presence or not of incentives to 
improve safety in each stretch.  
 
Data for accidents was supplied by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerio del Interior, 
2007-2009). For this study, the response variables are the yearly number of accidents, injuries 
and fatalities. Hence, three different models were analyzed.  
 
The descriptive statistics of endogenous and exogenous variables are provided in Table 2 and 
Table 3. The first descriptive statistics for the traffic variables AADT and %HGV and length 
indicated the need to use the logarithm transformation to expand low values and contract high 
values. The measures of central tendency take similar values through logarithm transformation. 
The natural logarithms of AADT, %HGV and length were used to minimize heteroskedasticity. 
After transformation, the range of values (maximum and minimum) of those variables were 
substantially reduced. The standard deviation is very low compared with the mean; therefore, 
the distribution was further improved. However, the chi square goodness of fit test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the variables follow a normal distribution.  
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics of endogenous variables.  
 
Years Variables Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Sum 
2007 
Accidents 3.38 4.49 0 29 802 
Injuries 6.39 9.27 0 70 1,515 
Fatalities 0.25 0.61 0 4 60 
2008 
Accidents 2.07 4.16 0 27 427 
Injuries 3.64 7.51 0 50 24 
Fatalities 0.12 0.52 0 5 708 
2009 
Accidents 2.80 4.17 0 21 708 
Injuries 4.97 7.75 0 46 1,257 
Fatalities 0.09 0.43 0 5 24 
 
 
Table 3  
Descriptive statistics of exogenous variables.  
 
Years Variables Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Sum 
2007 
AADT 21,566.27 15,660.01 1,608 71,198 - 
%HGV 12.87 5.97 3.56 34.13 - 
SPEED 122.36 13.83 89.40 174.50 - 
Length 9.38 7.01 0.28 43.26 2,222.62 
LANES 4.09 0.44 4 8 - 
INT 1.23 0.77 0 3 - 
INC 0.18 0.38 0 1 42 
2008 
AADT 21,868.18 15,110.88 1,732 66,296 - 
%HGV 12.45 5.89 2.99 32.61 - 
SPEED 112.33 7.00 73.00 120.70 - 
Length 9.51 7.17 0.13 42.84 1,959.93 
LANES 4.14 0.54 4 8 - 
INT 1.24 0.75 0 4 - 
INC 0.22 0.41 1 0 45 
2009 
AADT 22,790.14 16,373.35 1,370 73,175 - 
%HGV 12.37 9.35 2.36 54.23 - 
SPEED 112.77 6.42 73.00 120.70 - 
Length 9.86 6.88 0.13 29.05 2,949.06 
LANES 4.20 0.65 4 8 - 
INT 1.27 0.76 0 3 - 
INC 0.10 0.30 0 1 25 
 
5. Methodology and modelling results  
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In this paper we applied NB regression models to know the relationship between safety 
incentives given to the concessionaires and road safety in toll highways in Spain, controlling by 
other variables related to traffic flow and characteristic of the road stretches which are not 
manageable by the concessionaire.  
Before modelling the relationship between safety incentives and accidents, injuries and fatalities 
in toll highways, we tested the hypothesis that toll highway stretches with safety incentives 
present a lower number of accidents, injuries and fatalities.  
 
5.1 Test of hypotheses  
 
The aim of testing the hypotheses is to compare toll highway stretches with incentives and toll 
highway stretches without incentives. Since different stretches do not have the same traffic and 
same length, we used accident, injury and mortality indexes divided by millions of vehicle- 
kilometres. These indexes were calculated with the purpose of being able to compare toll 
highway stretches with incentives with toll highway stretches without incentives for each of the 
three years of the sample: 2007, 2008 and 2009.  
The accident index is defined as  ; the injury index is defined as 
 ; and the mortality index is defined as .  
 
The statistical distribution of these three metric measures is highly skewed and leptokurtic. It 
means that most of the stretches have a low number of accidents, while only a relatively small 
set of stretches have a high number of accidents. This fact limits the possible statistical tests that 
we can use to compare toll highway stretches with incentives with toll highway stretches 
without incentives. In the end, we decided to compare stretches using the Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945), which is non-parametric and is not affected by skewness in the 
distribution. The test compares two samples for each year under the null hypothesis that both 
samples have the same median value. The alternative hypothesis is that both medians are 
different.  
 
Table 4 presents the comparison of toll highways with incentives and without incentives using 
the Wilcoxon Rank Signed test. In this test, the null hypothesis is that there is no difference in 
the number of accidents, injuries or fatalities. The test tries to falsify this null hypothesis, to find 
out whether there is a statistical significant different between toll highways with safety 
incentives and toll roads without safety incentives.  
 
The table shows the p-value of the hypothesis test, considering 95% level of confidence. Thus, 
if the p-value is greater than 0.05 we cannot reject the null hypothesis so we cannot claim that 
there is difference between toll highway stretches with incentives and toll highway stretches 
without incentives. However, if the p-value is equal or lower than 0.05 we reject the null 
hypothesis, and conclude that the median of accidents is different between toll highway 
stretches with incentives and toll highway stretches without incentives. For informative 
purposes, we also show the mean value for toll highways with and without incentives. 
 
Summarizing the results, we found evidence that during 2008, toll highway stretches with safety 
incentives in Spain had a statistically significant lower number of accidents, injuries and 
fatalities compared to the toll highway stretches without incentives. Besides, in 2009 the 
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accident and injury indexes were statistically lower in PPP stretches with incentives compared 
with toll highway stretches without incentives.  
 
In the rest of the cases, we did not find evidence of differences, that is, we could not reject the 
null hypothesis, probably due to the limited size of the sample corresponding to toll roads with 
safety incentives. Compared to the overall population of toll road stretches, there are relatively 
few toll highway stretches with incentives in the Spanish highway network. This asymmetry in 
the sample is probably the cause of the results of the tests that do not reject the null hypothesis. 
However, that does not mean that the null hypothesis is true, it only means that test is 
inconclusive. Indeed, the harmful effects of accepting the null hypothesis in the absence of 
enough evidence has long been known in transport research (Hauer, 2004).  
 
In any case, the data clearly supports the hypothesis that in 2008 and 2009 toll highways with 
safety incentives were safer than toll highways without incentives. In 2007, and in the case of 
fatalities in 2009, our results are not conclusive. Because of that we decided to apply a negative 
binomial regression which is described in the next subsection.  
 
Table 4 
Average values of the indexes AI, II and MI for toll highways with and without safety 
incentives (p-values in brackets) 
 
 Inc. No inc. p-value Inc. No inc. p-value Inc. No inc. p-value 
 2007 2008 2009 
Accidents 10
-5
 0.061 (0.28) 3 10
-6
 0.041 (0.00) 1.2 10
-5
 0.041 (0.00) 
Injuries 3 10
-5
 0.110 (0.28) 4 10
-6
 0.069 (0.00) 2 10
-5
 0.072 (0.00) 
Fatalities 4 10
-6
 0.003 (0.28) 0 0.002 (0.04) 8 10
-7
 0.001 (0.08) 
 
5.2 Modelling accidents, injuries and fatalities  
Negative binomial regression (NB) was applied to determine the relationship between accidents 
(model 1), injuries (model 2) and fatalities (model 3) and traffic variables, number of lanes and 
number of intersections for each stretch, average speed and road safety incentives offered to the 
concessionaire. In this work the response variables are respectively accidents, injuries and 
fatalities.  
 
Table 5 summarizes the NB results. The significance of coefficients was checked using Wald 
statistic (in brackets), which rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero with a level of 
95% confidence.  
 
In order to select the best estimation models, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 
1974) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978) were used. AIC and BIC 
identify the best approximating model among a class of competing models with different 
numbers of parameters. The smaller the value of AIC and BIC the better the model. Other 
measures were also evaluated such as deviance, log-likelihood and Pearson chi-square statistics. 
  
To measure the overall goodness-of-fit statistics, the log-likelihood ratio 
 value of the model (analogous to R-square test in linear regression 
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models) was used.  is the log-likelihood at converge, and  is the log-likelihood at 
zero. It is an indication of the additional variation in accident frequency explained by the model 
to the constant term alone (Fridstrøm et al., 1995). 
 
Table 3 shows that all the variables have the expected sign according to the literature review. A 
positive sign indicates an increase in the number of accidents, injuries and fatalities whereas a 
negative sign indicating a decrease. Besides, all variables were statistically significant at 99.9% 
and 99% levels in the accident and injury models.  
 
Accidents increase with the increase of AADT. The coefficient sign of AADT is positive, 
suggesting that greater AADT is associated with higher accidents, injuries and fatalities. A 
similar conclusion was reached for the length. The longer the length of the road section, the 
more likely accidents, injuries and fatalities will occur on theses sections. These results confirm 
the hypothesis proposed by Mohamed et al. (2000), Persaud et al. (2000) and Anastasopoulos 
and Mannering (2009).  
 
The expected number of accidents and injuries decreases with increasing percentage of trucks. 
%HGV was found to be statistically significant for the accident and injury models. The 
coefficient signs are negative for all models. This result is in line with Hiselius (2004). The 
coefficient of Log(%HGV) in the fatalities model is smaller in magnitude than the same 
coefficient in accident and injury models. This could be related to the reduction of speed that 
heavy vehicles impose on light vehicles in the traffic flow. The crashes are much more likely to 
result in fatal outcomes in the presence of %HGV than if the crashes do not involve a higher 
%HGV in the traffic stream. 
 
According to the results of the model, accidents in toll highways slightly decrease with the 
increase of average speed, which is not a common result even though it is in line with some 
authors such as Navon (2013). A reason to explain this result may be the fact that the standard 
deviation of the variable SPEED in our database is very low so the range of speeds for the 
segments is short. The coefficient sign of SPEED is negative for all models, but its value turns 
out to be very small (-0.011, -0.014 and -0.001) so the effect on accidents, injuries and fatalities 
seems to be very low. This variable was found to be statistically significant for the accident and 
injury models, but not for fatalities. 
 
The INC variable showed the expected negative sign in all models, suggesting that establishing 
incentives in the contracts is associated with lower accidents, injuries and fatalities. This 
variable was found to be statistically significant for the accident and injury models, but not for 
fatalities. There are more accidents and injuries on highway segments without incentives than 
on highway segments with incentives. 
 
The results show that road safety tends to improve over the years. In 2007 there were more 
accidents, injuries and fatalities than in 2008 and 2009. This has been a general trend in Spain in 
the last few years because the government has been increasing the measures to reduce accidents 
through a stricter penalty points system. In general terms, the penalty points system is a system 
through which road safety authorities deduct points of the driver’s license of the person 
committing certain traffic violations. The use of this system came into force in July 2006 and 
was enacted in 2005 as Law 17/2005 of July 2005.  
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A larger number of LANES is associated with more accidents, injuries and fatalities. The reason 
for this is that in highways with more lanes there are more interactions between drivers so the 
probability of crashing increases. This result is in line with the findings by Noland and Oh 
(2004), Chang (2005) and Milton and Mannering (1998).  
 
The coefficient sign of INT is positive for all models, suggesting that a larger number of 
intersections are associated with more accidents, injuries and fatalities. This variable was found 
to be statistically significant for the accident and injury models. These results confirm the 
hypothesis proposed by Ivan and O’Mara (1997).  
 
Table 5 
Negative binomial regression models for accidents, injuries and fatalities.  
 
Independent Variables 
 
Coefficients (Wald statistics) 
Accidents  
(model 1) 
Injuries 
(model 2) 
Fatalities 
(model 3) 
Constant 
 -5.741 
a
 
(30.307) 
-5.357
 a
 
(30.539) 
-12.159
 a
 
(23.410) 
Log(AADT) 
 0.738
a
 
(98.676) 
0.780
 a
 
(128.817) 
0.742
 a
 
(14.699) 
Log(%HGV) 
 -0.837
 a
 
(44.611) 
-0.905
 a
 
(57.133) 
-0.346 
(1.662) 
SPEED 
 -0.011
 c
 
(5.700) 
-0.014
 b
 
(11.031) 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
INC 
stretch with  
incentives 
-0.683
 a
 
(16.086) 
-0.757
 a
 
(23.522) 
-0.033 
(0.006) 
stretch without 
incentives 0 
 
0 
 
0 
YEAR 
2009 
-0.690
 a
 
(27.626) 
-0.901
 a
 
(52.261) 
-1.339
 a
 
(17.839) 
2008 
-0.845
 a
 
(36.828) 
-1.090
 a
 
(68.504) 
-0.963
 c
 
(9.386) 
2007 0 0 0 
Log(length) 
 0.915
 a
 
(183.579) 
0.962
 a
 
(242.037) 
1.229
 a
 
(44.456) 
LANES 
 0.241
 b
 
(8.496) 
0.316
 a
 
(15.997) 
0.365
 c
 
(5.230) 
INT 
 0.210
 b
 
(10.427) 
0.229
 a
 
(14.394) 
0.211 
(1.899) 
AIC 
 
 2,683.878 3,305.914 557.309 
BIC 
 
 2,729.332 3,351.367 602.763 
Deviance (D
p
) 
 
 795.545 1,058.324 300.310 
Pearson Chi-Square (X
2
) 
 
 700.180 921.193 691.236 
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Log-likelihood at converge 
 
 
-1,331.939 -1,642.957 -268.655 
Log-likelihood at zero  -1,520.676 -1,889.159 -317.204 
 
 0.12 0.13 0.15 
Overdispersion parameter 
(k) 
 
 
1.160 1.543 1.008 
a p<0.001 
b p<0.01 
c p<0.05 
 
Elasticity values computed from the three models are displayed in Table 6. Elasticity shows the 
change in probability when an explanatory variable changes. As AADT, %HGV and length 
were estimated as logarithmic models, the elasticities are equivalent to the value of the 
coefficient estimated. 10% increase in AADT would increase accident frequencies in 7.4%. The 
results show that length has the greatest effect on the models estimated among all the 
independent variables.  
 
Table 6 
Elasticity estimates for the accident, injury and fatal models. 
 
Variables 
Elasticities 
Accident Injury Fatal 
AADT 0.74 0.78 0.74 
%HGV -0.84 -0.91 -0.35 
Length 0.92 0.96 1.23 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
After testing the hypothesis that incentives can be related to an improvement in road safety in 
toll highways, we found that the hypothesis is true for two of the years we analyzed, 2008 and 
2009 (with the exception of fatalities in 2009), but it cannot be shown to be true or false for 
2007. The main reason behind this result might be that the sample is not big enough to provide 
conclusive results. Compared to the overall number of road stretches in 2007, the number of 
stretches with incentives is still small to reach enough statistical significance. 
 
However, the results from the NB regression models demonstrate that toll highways with safety 
incentives are safer than toll highways without incentives in 2007, 2008 and 2009. The road 
safety incentive variable was found to be statistically significant for the accident and injury 
models, but not for the fatality model. This result proves that indicators related to accidents and 
injuries reflect better the ability of concessionaires to influence safety ratios than fatality ratios.  
 
Overall, from our research we can conclude that there is enough evidence to claim that safety 
incentives given to private concessionaires seem to have a positive influence on road safety 
ratios. The reason why this evidence is not so strong is likely to be the fact that road operators 
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have low incentives for road safety in Spain. As we have already mentioned earlier in the paper, 
safety incentives in Spain are not a substantial revenue source for the private sector so they are 
not large enough to encourage concessionaires to adopt strong measures to improve road safety. 
Consequently concessionaires are not expected to invest a lot in road safety improvements.  
 
A hypothesis derived from the results of this paper is that bonuses and penalties related to road 
safety should be greater to achieve a more notable reduction of accidents. In this respect, an 
important direction for future research would be to analyze the optimal size of the economic 
incentives set up in these types of contracts.  
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